The taxes would be a way to capture a portion of the annuity

Why are taxes on petroleum products high in developed countries The ecological argument is often advanced beyond the obvious motivation budget in the countries of the OECD, they can collect up to 6 of tax revenue. But taxation is not necessarily the effect on oil consumption. It can also have unexpected consequences on the sharing of the "oil rent". The taxes would be a way to capture a portion of the annuity.

Annuities from the exploitation of fossil resources are not the standard profits: they are due to the finite nature of these resources. To understand, put us to the point of view of the extracted oil. It is an asset portfolio manager, among which is a stock of resources. If the value of this asset does not increase at the rate of other assets, it will be away, either close the valves. Therefore, the resource market price, net of the cost of extraction and routing, will increase with exhaustion, generating well-known scarcity rents environmental economists. In this context, what is the impact of taxation on intertemporal calculation of the Extractor on the pension he receives

If the resource is clean, as are fossil fuels, society tends to deplete the resource too quickly, because integrates price information related to its rarity but does not take account of the damage that leads to its use. Encourage the producer to delay the extraction, to him suggest future conditions more favourable. The Government can promise a future decrease in the rate of tax. If it is credible, it may thus reduce the rate of extraction. However, such a policy requires coordinated international action a single Government is powerless and a capacity for commitment over the long term. What makes it difficult to put in place. Moreover, current taxes on petroleum products are not used in this way and should not influence the extraction. What are the consequences of their high level

Worldwide, the level of fees was likely little effect on the price paid by the consumer and the amount of oil consumed at a given time. For proof, just consider the hypothesis that these taxes would suddenly abolished in all countries: the intertemporal problem of extractors would remain and they have a priori no more interest than before to extract faster. All things being equal, if the amount available on the market does not increase, the price paid by the consumer will not be changed. However, the level of taxes affect the distribution between tax revenue and annuity of oil tankers, which are the two components of this award. Therefore, oil rents are amputees of revenues from taxes on petroleum products. OPEC has well understood, who accuses the G7 only him have thus deprived of 1,600 billion of pure annuity for the period 2000-2004, petroleum taxes being levied on the profits of the producers.

Accordingly, in a world where these taxes are determined at the national level, each country's interest to make strategic use, to accept the largest share of the prize pool. Governments arbitrate between low rates, generates little tax revenue, and high rates, locally against intensive sectors in energy for the benefit of those of the rest of the world. Oil-importing countries then have an incentive to tax that exporting countries have not: if they taxed, they captured their own pension. The differences between the countries thus translate into significant differences in taxation, taxes are very high there where oil is scarce and low, even negative (grants) in the producing countries. The producer price being everywhere the same, this generates final price differences and therefore a bad allocation: oil is not used by those who value the most. Moreover, the transfer of pension of the oil producing countries to those who consume the most can reach considerable proportions.

These large consumers of petroleum are typically developed countries (OECD represents 62 of global consumption), while the vast majority of reserves are located in countries on average six times less rich than the France. Some are even extremely poor Nigeria, for example, with $ 620 per capita and receive assistance in the development of the rich... It is understood that this aid is not intended to "annuitants. But these transfers of contrary sense suggest that the coordination of fiscal policies and aid policies could improve the efficiency of our trade with these countries.

Therefore, move that rich countries resumed with one hand what they give to poor countries rich in oil but oil only. The figures suggest also appear that the dramatic increase in the share of taxes in the price of petroleum products since forty years contributed to weakening growth in exporting countries. Hope that the better understanding of these mechanisms of distribution will enable to better combat that development economists have custom to call the "oil curse".