It is not void part revised public deficit at 12

The creditors of the Greek State had last week a surge of nervousness. It is not void part revised public deficit at 12.7 growth estimated at-2... The bad news are accumulated at a frantic pace since the summer. Result, the risk premium required on Greek sovereign debt has increased in a few months of 3 (300 basis points).

Europe remained remote until January, merely an occasional sermon. But since a few weeks, evidence appears to be imposed in the public debate in political circles: he must at all costs prevent the Greece of default and protect it from the pessimism of the markets. Fears of chain reactions based on misleading analogies (exchange crises, fall of Lehman) underlie we this willingness to act urgently. This fog conceptual derives a certain artistic blur in political statements.

First of all, some fear that the financial make refinancing of debt too costly in lobbying to increase interest rates, without the Greece by a kind of perverse self-fulfilling prophecy. Hard to believe this hypothesis: the cost of the Greek public debt remains after all rather reasonable (less than 7 on horizon 10 years). Therefore, it is not this additional cost, to may, precipitating the bankruptcy of the State. We also hear that the Greece let failure could cause a cascade of failures of the lower States of the zone. But the markets know the difference between borrowers of a monetary union. Exactly as a Renault obligation is not a Volkswagen duty, a good of the French Treasury is not a good Greek Treasury. Finally, there is concern that the Greek difficulties causing a slide of the euro and a flight of capital. However, the Greece is too small for its fundamental only strongly affect the euro. If the zone's growth prospects are overvalued and the Greece raises a realistic adjustment of expectations, it is a good thing, especially for our exporters. Bail out the Greek State does not rosira the economic fundamentals of the euro area.

Another fear is that of a contagion to the European banking system. Some large banks, German, Greek or French, may have a large amount of Greek debt on their balance sheets. A Greek default begin their own capital, which could lead to a new "credit crunch". The persistent opacity of the financial system does not exclude this hypothesis, but the solution it calls is not issue, once more, State guarantees. Financial institutions can ensure against Greek default. Signs that they are no doubt, the premium of the famous "credit default swaps" has increased the last few days. The situation demands so not that the taxpayer sponge again the risks taken by banks.

If its benefits are uncertain and limited, the costs of financial support to the Greek State, them, well known: it is the famous "moral hazard". It does not give the Greeks good incentives to restructure their spending and it removes their leaders the means to impose reality on their citizens. Finally, it sends to the other Member States the disaster message carelessness pay. In total, the illusion of a necessary solidarity between European sovereign debt does not withstand analysis.

The Greek State is not Lehman Brothers: its difficulties are not contagious. The good point of comparison, it is rather the California. It faced last year to an unprecedented financial crisis, has not gone bankrupt. It has implemented the budget very tight restrictions to satisfy its creditors. While the US Federal State throws the little finger.